Abstract. In one dimensional facility games, public facilities are placed based on the reported locations of the agents, where all the locations of agents and facilities are on a real line. The cost of an agent is measured by the distance from its location to the nearest facility. We study the approximation ratio of social welfare for strategy-proof mechanisms, where no agent can benefit by misreporting its location. In this paper, we use the total cost of agents as social welfare function. We study two extensions of the simplest version as in [9] : two facilities and multiple locations per agent. In both cases, we analyze randomized strategy-proof mechanisms, and give the first lower bound of 1.045 and 1.33, respectively. The latter lower bound is obtained by solving a related linear programming problem, and we believe that this new technique of proving lower bounds for randomized mechanisms may find applications in other problems and is of independent interest. We also improve several approximation bounds in [9] , and confirm a conjecture in [9] .
Introduction
In a facility game, a planner is building public facilities while agents (players) are submitting their locations. In this paper, we study the facility game in one dimension, i.e., the locations of the agents and the facilities are in the real line. Let the position reported by agent i be x i ∈ R i ⊆ R. Assume the number of agents is n and the number of public facilities available is k. A (deterministic) mechanism for the k-facility game is simply a function
In this paper, we assume R i = R for all agents. The cost of an agent is the distance from its true location to the nearest facility. Let {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l k } be the set of locations of the facilities. The cost of agent i is cost({l 1 , . . . , l k }, x i ) = min 1≤j≤k |x i − l j |. A randomized mechanism returns a distribution over R k . Then the cost of agent i is the expected cost over the distribution returned by the randomized mechanism.
An agent may misreport its location if it can reduce its own cost. A usual solution concept is strategy-proofness, which is also the focus of this paper. In solutions for both extensions. However, in many real world scenarios, payment is not available as noted by Schummer and Vohra [11] . We focus on the strategyproof mechanisms without money in this paper.
Our result
We study the approximation ratios of social welfare for the strategy-proof mechanisms in the facility game with one or more facilities. The social welfare function we use is the social cost, i.e., the total cost of all agents. We focus on the approximation ratios for social cost of the strategy-proof mechanisms, where we improve most results in [9] . Furthermore, we also provide several novel approximation bounds which are not previously available. Table 1 summarizes our contribution.
Two Facilities
Multi-Location Per Agent (One Facility) Deterministic UB: (n − 2) LB: 2(1.5)
UB: (3 [5] ) LB: (3 [5] ) Randomized UB: n/2 (n − 2) LB: 1.045(N/A)
for n = 2 only) LB: 1.33 (N/A) Table 1 . Our results are in bold. The numbers in brackets are previous results in [9] unless stated otherwise. (N/A means no previous known bound. ) The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide improved upper and lower bounds of both deterministic and randomized strategy-proof mechanisms for the two-facility game. In Section 3, we study the cases when each agent controls more than one location. We conclude our paper in Section 4 with several open problems.
The Two-Facility Game
In this section, we study strategy-proof mechanisms for the two-facility game. We first provide a better randomized mechanism achieving approximation ratio n/2 for social cost. The only previously known upper bound is n − 2, which is from a deterministic mechanism. Then we study the lower bounds both for the deterministic and randomized cases. For deterministic mechanisms, the lower bound is improved to 2 from 1.5 in [9] . For randomized mechanisms, we provide the first non-trivial approximation ratio lower bound of 1.045.
A Better Randomized Mechanism
The following mechanism is inspirited by Mechanism 2 from [9] . However, our proof is different and much simpler. Mechanism 1. See Figure 1 for reference. Let x = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } be the reported locations of the agents. Define lt(x) = min{x i }, rt(x) = max{x i } and mt(x) = (lt(x) + rt(x))/2. We further define the left boundary lb(x) = max{x i : i ∈ N, x i ≤ mt(x)} and the right boundary rb(x) = min{x i : i ∈ N, x i ≥ mt(x)}. Let dist(x) = max{rt(x)−rb(x), lb(x)−lt(x)}. We set lb(x) = lt(x)+dist(x) and rb(x) = rt(x) − dist(x). The mechanism returns (lt(x), rt(x)) or (lb(x), rb(x)), each with probability 1/2. Fig. 1 . Mechanism 1 picks (lt(x), rt(x)) or (lb(x), rb(x)), each with probability 1/2. Theorem 1. Mechanism 1 is strategy-proof. The approximation ratio of Mechanism 1 is n/2 for social cost.
Proof. We first prove the approximation ratio assuming that all agents report their true locations. By symmetry, we assume rt(x) − rb(x) ≥ lb(x) − lt(x) as in Figure 1 . Since we only have two facilities, either lt(x) and rb(x) or rb(x) and rt(x) are served by a same facility. Therefore the optimal solution is least min{|lt(x)−rb(x)|, |rb(x)−rt(x)|} = dist(x). On the other hand, for each agent, its expected cost is exactly dist(x)/2 in this mechanism. So Mechanism 1 has an approximation ratio of n 2 . We then prove that Mechanism 1 is strategy-proof. We first show that any point other than the 3 points defining lt(x), rt(x) and rb(x) cannot benefit by misreporting its location. Let the new configuration be x . Consider the 3 points defining the previous lt(x), rt(x) and rb(x). No matter how the 3 points are partitioned by the new mt(x ), dist(x ) ≥ rt(x) − rb(x), where x is the new configuration. We know that the expected cost for any location in this configuration is at least dist(x )/2, which is at least as large as the honest cost dist(x) = rt(x) − rb(x). The same argument also shows lt(x) (resp. rt(x)) does not have incentive of reporting positions on the left (resp. right).
Consider the point rb(x). Its expected cost is
if it reports its true location. By lying, it cannot move the left or right boundary towards itself, and as a result, its expected cost in any new configuration is at least min{|lt(x) − rb(x)|, |rb(x) − rt(x)|}/2 = (rt(x) − rb(x))/2. Therefore, the point at rb(x) has no incentive to lie.
The only possible case left to analyze is that the agent at lt(x) (resp. rt(x)) is reporting a location to the right (resp. left). Its expected cost is (rt(x) − lb(x))/2 if it reports its true location. Reporting a location on its right can only move lb(x ) toward right, which will hurt itself. Therefore the agent at lt(x) has no incentive to lie. Similar argument also holds if the agent at rt(x) reports its location on the left of rt(x).
To sum up, no agent has incentive to lie. Therefore, Mechanism 1 is strategyproof.
Lower Bounds
In this section, we show the approximation ratio lower bounds both for deterministic and randomized strategy-proof mechanisms. Both bounds are proved by the following construction, which is similar to the 1.5 lower bound example in [9] . Theorem 2 (Lower bound for deterministic mechanisms.). In the twofacility game, any deterministic strategy-proof mechanism f : R n → R 2 has an approximation ratio of at least 2 − 4 n−2 for social cost. Proof. See Figure 2 for the configuration. We have n − 2 nodes at the origin and the left node at −1 and the right node at 1.
Assume to the contrary, there exists a strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio less than 2. Then this mechanism has to place one facility in the range (− 2 n−2 , 2 n−2 ). Now consider the left node and the right node at −1 and 1. At least one of them is 1 − 2/(n − 2) away from its closest facility. Without loss of generality, assume the right node at 1 is at least 1 − 2 n−2 away from the facilities.
If there is one facility on the right of 1, it must be placed at a position right to 2 − 2/(n − 2) by our assumption. In this case, since the optimal cost is 1, the approximation ratio is at least 2 − 4 n−2 as one facility is always close to the origin. Now consider the case that the closest facility to the right node at 1 is on the left. Let I be the image set of the closest facility to the right node when the right node moves and all other nodes remain fixed. Clearly, by strategyproofness, I ∩ ( is at p. Therefore, the cost of the mechanism for such a configuration is at least 2 − 4 n−2 , as the other facility has to be close to the origin. Because the optimal cost is still 1, the approximation ratio is at least 2 − 4 n−2 . If the mechanism is randomized, the output is a distribution over R 2 . Notice that in a randomized mechanism, the cost of an agent is measured by the expected distance from its true location to the closest facility. We give the first non-trivial (greater than 1) approximation ratio lower bound of strategy-proof mechanisms for social cost in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Lower bound for randomized mechanisms.). In a two-facility game, any randomized strategy-proof mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 1 +
n−2 for the social cost for any n ≥ 5. Proof. Again, we consider the point set as in Figure 2 . Let the expected distance from −1, 0 and 1 to the closest facility be e 1 , e 2 and e 3 respectively. Clearly, we have e 1 + e 2 + e 3 ≥ 1. For any randomized strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio at most 2, e 2 ≤ 2 n−2 . Without loss of generality, we assume
Now we place the right node at 1 to a new position at 1 + α for some α ∈ (0, 1/2). Let e 3 be the expected distance from 1 + α to the nearest facility at the new configuration by the same strategy-proof mechanism. Because of strategyproofness, e 3 ≥ Let p(x) be the probability density function of the probability that the closest facility to the right node at 1 + α is at x in the new configuration. When x ≤ − 1 n−2 , the closest facility is at weighted distance at least 1 to nodes at 0. When x ≥ 1 n−2 , for any placement of the other facility, the sum of the weighted distances to the closest facility for the nodes at −1 and 0 is at least 1. In these two cases, the weighted distance to nodes at −1 and 0 is at least 1. Denote P = 1 n−2
Therefore, the total cost of the mechanism in the new configuration is at least:
On the other hand, consider the distance to the node at 1 + α. When the closest facility to 1 + α is x ∈ (− 1 n−2 , 1 n−2 ), the total weighted distance from the nodes to the closest facilities is at least 1 + α. Therefore, we have
The optimal ratio is achieved when P =
and the approximation ratio is at least
1+α . The maximum ratio is achieved when g (α) = 0 with α = 2− √ 2 4 , and the approximation ratio is at least 1 +
Both lower bounds for deterministic and randomized strategy-proof mechanisms can be generalized to k facilities for k ≥ 3. (Consider the configuration that two nodes on the two sides, and k − 1 group of nodes in between. Each group of nodes (including the two singletons) are at unit distance away.) We have a direct corollary.
Corollary 1 (Lower
bound for the k-facility game.). In the k-facility game for k ≥ 2, any deterministic strategy-proof mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 2 − 4 m for the social cost, where m = n−2 k−1 . Any randomized strategy-proof mechanism for the k-facility game has an approximation ratio of at least 1 + √ 2−1 12−2 √ 2 − 1 m ≥ 1.045 − 1 m .
Multiple Locations Per Agent
In this section, we study the case that each agent controls multiple locations. Assume agent i controls w i locations, i.e., x i = {x i1 , x i2 , . . . , x iwi }. A (deterministic) mechanism with one facility in the multiple locations setting is a function f : R w1 × · · · × R wn → R for n agents. Then, for agent i, its cost is defined as cost(l, x i ) = wi j=1 |l−x ij |, where l is the location of the facility. As before, we are interested in minimizing the social cost of the agents, i.e., i∈N wi j=1 |l − x ij |, where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We first give a tight analysis of a randomized strategy-proof mechanism proposed in [9] . This in particular confirms a conjecture of [9] . Then we prove the first approximation ratio lower bound of 1.33 for any randomized truthful mechanism. This lower bound even holds for the simplest case that there are only two player and each controls the same number of locations. As pointed out by [9] , our result here can be directly applied in the incentive compatible regression learning setting of Dekel et al. [5] .
A Tight Analysis of a Randomized Mechanism
In [9] , Procaccia and Tennenholtz proposed the following randomized mechanism in the setting of multiple locations:
Randomized Median Mechanism: Given x = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n }, return med(x i ) with probability w i /( j∈N w j ).
If w i is even, med(x i ) can either report the wi 2 th location or wi 2 +1-th location of x i . In [9] , Procaccia and Tennenholtz gave a tight analysis for the case of two players(n = 2), which has an approximation ratio of 2 + |w1−w2| w1+w2 . They proposed as an open question for the bound in the general setting. In this section, we give a tight analysis of this randomized mechanism in the general setting, which in particular confirms the conjecture. Notice that 2 + Proof. If n = 1, med(x 1 ) is the optimal solution. So the mechanism has an approximate ratio of 3 − 2w 1 /w 1 = 1. Now we consider the case for n ≥ 2.
Without loss of generality, we can reorder the players so that med(x 1 ) ≤ med(x 2 ) ≤ · · · ≤ med(x n ). Then it must be the case that med(x 1 ) ≤ med(x) ≤ med(x n ). The idea here is to construct a worst case instance for this mechanism and then analyze the approximate ratio for the worst case. Let i be the largest i such that med(x i ) ≤ med(x).
Claim. We can assume that the worst case satisfies the following properties: (1) w i is even for all i ∈ N ; (2) for all i ≤ i , med(x i ) returns the We justify the claim as follows: if some w i is odd, we can add one more point for agent i at the global median med(x), then the original med(x i ) is still one of i-th two medians after adding the new point. We still return that value when we need to return med(x i ). After the modification, the expected cost can only increase while the optimal cost remain the same. So we can assume all w i are even in a worst case. The properties (2) and (3) are obvious because returning the other point only improves the performance of the mechanism. Now we assume that our instance satisfies all properties in Claim 1. By symmetry, we can further assume
and R(med(x i )) be the rank of med(x i ) in the whole set x. Let X be the ordered global set of x and X i be the ith location in X. We perturb the points so that X i and R(med(x i )) are well defined. Then for all i ≤ i , R(med(x i )) ≥ We further make the two sides more symmetric as follows. If w 1 > w n , previously, the mechanism returns X w 1 2 with probability . We continue this process and finally we can get the following mechanism. There are 0 = k 0 < k 1 < k 2 < · · · < k m and l ≤ m. The mechanism returns X ki and X W +1−ki both with probability
wi 2 . However due to the symmetrization process described above, we also have
and k m + k l = W/2. To simply the notation, we defineī = W +1−i and
. Now we can compute the expected cost for this mechanism. For 1 ≤ i ≤ l, we calculate the cost for X ki and Xk i together. They both have probability 
Now consider the case for l + 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Similarly, the cost of X ki is
Therefore the expected cost of the mechanism is no more than
The following corollary confirms a conjecture of [9] regarding the case where each agent controls the same number of locations.
Corollary 2. If all the players control the same number of locations, the approximate ratio of Randomized Median Mechanism is 3 − 2 n for social cost.
Lower Bounds for Randomized Strategy-proof Mechanisms
In this section, we consider the lower bound of the approximation ratios for randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in the multiple locations setting. We first give a 1.2 lower bound of the approximation ratio, based on a very simple instance. Then we extend to a more complicated instance, which we derive a lower bound of 1.33 by solving a linear programming instance.
Theorem 5. Any randomized strategy-proof mechanism of the one-facility game has an approximation ratio at least 1.2 for social in the setting that each agent controls multiple locations.
Proof. We assume to the contrary that there exists one strategy-proof mechanism M which has an approximate ratio c < 1.2. Consider the following three instances:
Instance 1 First player has 2 points at 0 and 1 point at 1; second player has 3 points at 1. Instance 2 First player has 3 points at 0; second player has 3 points at 1. Instance 3 First player has 3 points at 0; second player has 1 point at 0 and 2 points at 1.
Let P 1 , P 2 and P 3 be the distribution of the facility the mechanism M gives for these three instances respectively. For all x ∈ R and a distribution P on R, we use cost(P, x) to denote E y∼P |y − x|. Then we have (for all i = 1, 2, 3)
We use p 1 (x), p 2 (x) and p 3 (x) to denote the probability density function of P 1 , P 2 and P 3 respectively. Let
Now, we computer the cost of the players in each distribution. For the first player in Instance 1, its cost in distribution P i is
where the second inequality is because of the strategy-proofness (of the first player in Instance 1). By symmetry, we also have
Using similar calculation as above, we can get the expected cost of Instance 1 as follows.
Since the optimal cost is 2 and the approximate ratio is less than 1.2, we know that cost(P 1 , 1) + 2 < 2 × 1.2 = 2.4. Therefore, we have cost(P 1 , 1) < 0.2 and hence cost(P 1 , 0) > 0.8. Substituting the above inequality into (1), we get cost(P 2 , 0) + 2(L 2 + R 2 ) > 0.8. Again by symmetry, we also have cost(P 2 , 1) + 2(L 2 + R 2 ) > 0.8. Adding these two inequalities together, we have cost(P 2 , 0) + cost(P 2 , 1) + 4(L 2 + R 2 ) > 1.6. We also have cost(P 2 , 0) + cost(P 2 , 1) = 1 + 2(L 2 + R 2 ). Substituting this, we get L 2 + R 2 > 0.1. On the other hand, note the approximate ratio condition of Instance 2 requires that 1 + 2(L 2 + R 2 ) < 1.2. Thus we reach a contradiction.
To prove the lower bound of 1.33, we extend the above instances as follows. We employ 2K + 1 (K ≥ 1 is an integer) instances (for K = 1, this is exactly the same set of instances as above):
First player has K + i points at 0 and K + 1 − i points at 1; second player has all 2K + 1 points at 1. Instance K + 1: First player has all 2K + 1 points at 0; second player has all 2K + 1 points at 1.
First player has all 2K + 1 points at 0; second player has i − K − 1 points at 0 and 3K + 2 − i points at 1.
Again, let P i be the distribution of output of the mechanism on Instance i. Define the variables as X i = cost(P i , 0) and Y i = cost(P i , 1). Then, the strategyproofness among the instances can be listed as linear constrains. Assume the approximation ratio is α. We want to compute the minimal ratio α so that all constrains are satisfied. It is then straightforward to formulate the following linear programming problem. 
First two sets of constrains come from the approximate ratio constrain. The next two sets of constrains are enforced by strategy-proofness. And the last two sets of constrains are boundary conditions.
Choosing K = 500, we solve this LP problem by computer and the optimal value is greater than 1.33. Therefore, if we set the approximation ratio to 1.33, there is no feasible solution for the linear programming which implies no feasible strategy-proof mechanism for the instances. So we have an approximation lower bound of 1.33. Theorem 6. Any randomized strategy-proof mechanism of the one-facility game has an approximation ratio at least 1.33 in the setting that each agent controls multiple locations.
The numerical computation suggests that the optimal value for this LP problem is close to 4 3 when K is large. It would be interesting to give an analytical proof for a lower bound of 
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the strategy-proof mechanisms in facility games. We derive approximation bounds for such mechanisms for social cost both in the two-facility game and the multiple location setting. Our results improves several bounds previously studied [9] . We also obtain some new approximation ratio lower bounds.
There are still a lot of interesting open questions. For example, in the twofacility game, the deterministic mechanism has an approximation ratio of n − 2 for social cost, while the lower bound is only 2. In randomized case, there is also a huge gap between n/2 and 1.045.
